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INTRODUCTION
The longstanding conflict in the Middle East has resulted in
political turmoil, the loss of tens of thousands of lives, and the
displacement of hundreds of thousands more.1 These atrocities
can be linked to the Assad regime in Syria, along with ISIS
attacks across the region.2 There has been a global response to
try to curtail the violence and end the humanitarian crisis that
has resulted in over one million Syrian refugees.3 While the
world has been rightly focused on the tragedies of death and
displacement, the destruction of cultural property by individuals
associated with terrorist organizations has been an overlooked
aspect to the humanitarian crisis.
This Note shows that a calculated global response is needed
to address the issue of mass destruction of cultural property and
heritage sites across Europe and the Middle East. Part I of this
Note describes the background of the destruction of cultural
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1. Greg Botelho, What’s Happening in the Middle East and Why it Matters,
CNN (Jan. 24, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/01/23/middleeast/
middle-east-country-breakdown/index.html.
2. Id.
3. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Urges Countries to Take in 480,000
Syrian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
03/31/world/middleeast/united-nations-ban-ki-moon-syria-refugees.html.
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property and the multiple sources of international law that have
attempted to govern the destruction of cultural property. Part I
then proceeds with a case study from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. This section introduces
Al Mahdi, the background of his case in the ICC, and its
outcome. Part II, the analysis section, addresses the significance
of Al Mahdi’s case in the context of the broader global effort to
combat the destruction of cultural property. Lastly, Part II
argues that a strong relationship between the five permanent
members (P5) on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
and the ICC is necessary to deter the destruction of cultural
property in the future. A stronger ICC would lead more states to
take steps to protect their cultural property, and also deter
wrongdoers from carrying out these crimes. Moreover, domestic
militia in foreign territories would be more likely to protect
cultural property during times of armed conflict due to
customary legal norms that would emerge out of ICC
jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AIMED AT PROTECTING CULTURAL
PROPERTY
There are many sources of international law including
numerous treaties aimed at protecting cultural property from
being destroyed.4 The main difficulty in such protection,
however, has been acquiring state signatories to sign on, thereby
binding them to protect cultural property from being destroyed.5
1. History of the Protection of Cultural Property
The destruction of cultural property has been occurring for
centuries. From the shelling of the Mostar Bridge in Bosnia
Herzegovina and the Nazi destruction of synagogues and
plundering of art during World War II, to al-Qaeda’s terrorist
4. See generally CAROLINE EHLERT, PROSECUTING THE DESTRUCTION OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 2–45 (2014)
(describing the history of the prohibition of the destruction of cultural property
within international treaties).
5. See, e.g., Matthew D. Thurlow, Note, Protecting Cultural Property in
Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International Law, 8 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 165 (2005).

2018]

CONSERVING CULTURE

583

attacks on the World Trade Centers, the world has seen
countless monuments be destroyed.6
The first attempts to protect cultural property came during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the
Renaissance.7 Early international law scholars such as Hugo
Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel believed that religious property
like churches, memorials, temples, tombs, public buildings, and
public monuments should be protected from destruction.8
However, it was still acceptable to destroy buildings of this sort
in order to pursue military operations that were deemed a
“necessity.”9 De Vattel’s discourse brought about progress
during the eighteenth century, whereby, despite the lack of a
formal international treaty governing the destruction of cultural
property, warring parties began to show due regard for religious
and educational institutions in times of war.10 As this concept
eventually emerged into customary international law,11 coming
to an agreement on binding treaties proved difficult because of
the inability to harmonize internationally-accepted definitions
of “destruction,” “cultural property,” and “cultural heritage.”12
Classic sources of international law have attempted to set
the parameters for these terms. For example, “destruction” is
known as “[d]emolishing manufactured products, installations
and materials, or interrupting them or putting them out of order,
for offensive or defensive purposes in the course of military
operations.”13 “Cultural property” has been commonly defined as
“[m]ovable or immovable property that has cultural significance,
whether of the nature of antiquities and monuments of classical
age or important modern items of fine arts, decorative arts, and
architecture.”14 “Cultural heritage” has been explained as
“movable property (artistic works) as well as immovable
property (monuments, buildings, sites), works of expression
(music, dance, theatre), intangible cultural property (folklore,
talents, rituals, religious beliefs, intellectual traditions).”15
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See EHLERT, supra note 4, at 1–2.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 40–41 (1992).
14. Cultural Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
15. JIŘÍ TOMAN, PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF
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These terms have been implemented into modern international
treaties to attempt to govern the destruction of cultural
property.
2. Sources of International Law Governing the Destruction
of Cultural Property
International law, much like domestic law, has evolved and
attempted to implement individual responsibility for the
destruction of cultural property. Early international
humanitarian law was primarily governed by the theory of jus
in bello, which governed the conduct of war once initiated.16 In
1868, the St. Petersburg Declaration was adopted by dozens of
nations in response to the Russian invention of a bullet that
exploded on contact and caused mass damage.17 The declaration
stated that “the only legitimate object which States should
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
force of the enemy.”18 Hence, cultural property was off limits.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions further codified violations of
the destruction of cultural property. Articles 33 and 53 protect
property from being pillaged, and only allow for the destruction
of real property when it is an absolute necessity during military
operations.19 Article 27 essentially protects cultural property by
ensuring that protected persons have access to their “churches
and other buildings dedicated to religion, which indirectly
protects these institutions from being destroyed.”20
A major development occurred in 1954, when two
agreements were concluded. The Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with
Regulations of the Execution of the Convention21 and the
ARMED CONFLICT 40 (1996).
16. Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Oct. 29,
2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.
17. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/130?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
18. Id.
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 33, 53, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
20. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 41; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 19, art. 27.
21. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956).
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Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
an Armed Conflict.22 The 1954 Hague Convention was the first
international convention that exclusively dealt with the
protection of cultural property.23 The main premise behind the
Convention was the notion that there was a general, unified
interest in protecting cultural property.24 Today, the 1954 Hague
Convention has 131 States parties, and is seen by many authors
and scholars as customary international law.25
3. Can Individuals be Held Liable for the Destruction of
Cultural Property under International Criminal Law?
Strengthening an international system that punishes
individuals for destroying cultural property is essential in order
to thwart the ongoing epidemic. While still a flawed institution,
the ICC has the greatest potential to bring these “cultural
terrorists” to justice and protect cultural property from being
destroyed.
International criminal law (ICL) does not simply
incorporate all of international humanitarian law (IHL) or
human rights law because many states do not regard most of
these violations as entailing individual responsibility.26 Early
forms of ICL were codified in Article 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where the court
had jurisdiction to prosecute defendants for crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.27 An offense
falls under the auspices of ICL if it meets three conditions: first,
the offense “must entail individual responsibility and be subject
to punishment; second, the norm must be part of the body of
international law; third, the offense must be punishable
regardless of whether it has been incorporated into domestic
law.”28 The third prong is particularly important because, as
22. Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956); see
also EHLERT, supra note 4, at 43.
23. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 43.
24. Id.
25. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/400
(last visited Mar. 6, 2018); EHLERT, supra note 4, at 44.
26. See EHLERT, supra note 4, at 4.
27. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
28. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 7.
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with some treaties discussed in the previous section, not all
states have adopted them, and thus have not bound themselves
to their language.29 Further, because some scholars regard
neither the Geneva Conventions nor Hague Conventions as
customary international law,30 the offense must be punishable
regardless of whether it has been incorporated into domestic
law.
The primary international institution that enforces ICL is
the ICC. The Rome Statute, which entered into force on July 1,
2002,31 established the ICC and deemed it a permanent
institution, responsible for prosecuting heinous crimes:
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.32 There are
currently 123 countries that are States Parties to the Rome
Statute, with 33 African states comprising the majority of any
regional group.33
Article 8 of the Rome Statute defines a number of war
crimes that may be applied in cases related to the destruction of
cultural property.34 Specifically, Article 8 labels extensive
destruction and appropriation of property and “intentionally
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes,” among others, as
war crimes.35
Even though the foundation for prosecuting individuals for
the destruction of cultural property is codified in the Rome
Statute, the actual investigations have seldom been completed.36
There are three primary criticisms of the ICC’s lack of authority

29. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the
Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. U.S. NAVAL WAR C. 37, 39
(2006).
30. EHLERT, supra note 4, at 44; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 165–67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001).
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
32. Id. art. 5.
33. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/EN_Menus/asp/Pages/asp_home.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2018)
[hereinafter States Parties to the Rome Statute].
34. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 8.
35. Id.
36. See Mark Kersten, The Al-Mahdi Case Is a Breakthrough for the
International Criminal Court, JUST. CONFLICT (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/25/the-al-mahdi-case-is-a-breakthroughfor-the-international-criminal-court/.
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and inability to carry out investigations: the ICC has failed to
garner universal support from powerful states, there is a
complicated relationship between the ICC and the UNSC, and
the ICC has been accused of systematically ignoring human
rights abuses.37
a. The ICC Does Not Have Universal Support
Although 123 nations have signed the Rome Statute,
powerful states such as the United States, Russia, and China
have all been reluctant to sign on.38 Former United States
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld laid out numerous
objections to the ICC, such as the lack of adequate checks and
balances on powers of the Court’s prosecutors and judges, and
the lack of any effective mechanism to prevent politicized
prosecutions of American service members and officials.39
Another common rationale for the United States’ reluctance to
join the ICC comes from the “American Exceptionalist”
viewpoint that Americans, not the international community, can
better help suffering people.40 Because of these longstanding
American views, devoting resources and sacrificing some
sovereignty in order to support the ICC in carrying out
prosecutions against individuals accused of destroying cultural
property has been difficult. With much more pressing and
widespread humanitarian crises ongoing, the United States-ICC
relationship remains unlikely to be changed and at the mercy of
the current president’s personal opinion of the Court.41
37. See David Hoile, ICC: The Failure that Keeps on Failing, NEW AFR.
MAG. (Mar. 23, 2015), http://newafricanmagazine.com/icc-failure-keeps-failing/;
see also Richard Dicker, Introduction, The ICC at 10, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 539 (2013).
38. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 33 (noting that 124
countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute).
39. Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International
Criminal Court Treaty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (May 11, 2002), https://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/7/issue/7/us-announces-intent-not-ratify-internationalcriminal-court-treaty.
40. See Melinda Negrón-Gonzales & Michael Contarino, Local Norms
Matter: Understanding National Responses to the Responsibility to Protect, 20
GLOB. GOVERNANCE 255, 267 (2014); Matthey Bulger, The International
Criminal Court: Why Is the United States Not a Member?, THEHUMANIST.COM
(June 19, 2013), https://thehumanist.com/news/international/the-internationalcriminal-court-why-is-the-united-states-not-a-member.
41. Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L JUST.
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.internationaljusticeproject.com/theevolving-us-policy-towards-the-icc/. See also John Bellinger, The International
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b. The Relationship Between the ICC and UNSC is
“Complicated”

The ICC is based on the principle of complementarity,
whereby the court will not investigate and prosecute cases when
states are willing and able to do so themselves.42 The principle
of complementarity, however, is hampered by the UNSC. One
way that cases fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction is by referral
from the UNSC.43 However, because the Council is an
undemocratic and political body, the referral power to the ICC
has come at a “high cost for the legitimacy and functioning of”
the Court.44 Moreover, because three of the five permanent
members on the UNSC have not ratified the Rome Statute,45 any
veto effectively immunizes themselves and their allies from any
potential investigation or prosecution.46 Thus, complementarity
and states’ willingness and ability to investigate and prosecute
cases are not always the end all be all of employing the ICC.
For example, many scholars have thoroughly examined how
the language of the UNSC resolutions referring the situations in
Sudan and Libya “limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to the relevant
state under investigation . . . suggesting a hierarchy of crimes
based on the individuals that perpetrated them.”47 Some actions,
such as Russia’s acts in Chechnya and Israel’s occupation of
Palestinian territories, have been off limits to the ICC because
of the inevitable P5 vetoes.48 The ICC has also been unable to
investigate the destruction of cultural and religious monuments
Criminal Court and the Trump Administration, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://lawfareblog.com/international-criminal-court-and-trumpadministration (arguing President Trump’s appointment of John Bolton as
national security advisor will likely mean that the United States will not
support the ICC under the Trump Administration).
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 17.
43. See Id. art. 13.
44. Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Regionalism, Regime Complexes, and the Crisis
in International Criminal Justice, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 699, 711 (2016).
45. See States Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 33 (showing that
United States, Russia, and China have not signed the Rome Statute);
Permanent and Non-Permanent Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
46. Sirleaf, supra note 44.
47. Rosa Aloisi, A Tale of Two Institutions: The United Nations Security
Council and the International Criminal Court, in THE REALITIES OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 153 (Dawn L. Rothe et al. eds., 2013).
48. See, e.g., Mark Tran, Background: International Criminal Court,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2009, 7:13 AM EST), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2009/jan/26/international-criminal-court.
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in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.49 Because these
countries are not members of the court, only a specific mandate
from the UNSC gives the ICC jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute these war crimes.50 The politics in the UNSC
effectively immobilizes the ICC from investigating and
prosecuting war criminals that are killing others; this is a bad
sign for any agreement to prosecute individuals accused of
destroying cultural property.
c. The ICC Has Systematically Ignored Human Rights
Abuses
Some scholars have charged the ICC with ignoring blatant
human rights violations perpetrated by powerful nations, such
as the P5, in selecting its investigations.51 Additionally,
observers have noted that it is not coincidental that the only
places where the ICC is investigating and prosecuting
individuals are where the United States and other powerful
states have few interests or resources.52 In its brief history, the
ICC has only prosecuted Africans, a continent with a weak global
position and with few natural resources that make it an
unimportant ally of the United States.53 There was hope that the
United States would tone down its opposition to the ICC during
the Obama administration, but the United States’ ratification of
the Rome Treaty was still seen as highly unlikely.54

49. See Marlise Simmons, Prison Sentence over Smashing of Shrines in
Timbuktu: 9 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/28/world/europe/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-timbuktu-mali.html?_r=2.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Ifeonu Eberechi, “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects”:
Exclusion, Selectivity, and Impunity in the Enforcement of International
Criminal Justice and the African Union’s Emerging Resistance, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 51, 56 (2011).
52. Mahmood Mamdani, Darfur, ICC and the New Humanitarian Order:
How the ICC’s “Responsibility to Protect” is Being Turned into an Assertion of
NEWS
(Sept.
17,
2008),
Neocolonial
Domination,
PAMBAZUKA
https://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/50568.
53. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:22PM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/
01/14/africa-attacks-international-criminal-court.
54. See Tran, supra note 48.
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B. PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD AL FAQI AL MAHDI

Although the ICC has been flawed in its ability to
investigate and prosecute individuals for their crimes, including
the destruction of cultural property, there has been a recent
revelation in the prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi that
gives the institution some credibility and hope. This section will
lay out the facts of Al Madhi’s case, including how it was brought
to the ICC, and its outcome.
1. The Facts
A coalition of Tuareg rebels and Islamic militant factions
including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a local group
called Ansar Dine seized much of the northern part of Mali in
mid-2012.55 These rebels enforced a harsh version of Sharia law
in areas under their control, banning music, forcing women to
wear the burqa and preventing girls from attending school.56 Al
Mahdi traveled to Timbuktu shortly after it fell to the
extremists.57 He was later named their religious adviser and was
given command of the Hisba, a religious police charged with
stamping out “evil practices” and encouraging “correct”
behavior.58
In mid-2012, Al Mahdi led a group of radicals that destroyed
fourteen of Timbuktu’s sixteen mausoleums.59 These
mausoleums contained one-room structures that housed the
tombs of the city’s greatest thinkers, and were also listed on the
World Heritage List.60 Al Mahdi and his radical-led group
considered these tombs “totems of idolatry,” and counter to the
ideals of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other Islamic factions.61 The
55. Jason Burke, ICC Ruling for Timbuktu Destruction “Should Be
Deterrent for Others,” GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:25 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/27/timbuktu-shrines-iccsentences-islamic-militant-nine-years-destruction-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Pleads Guilty at ICC to Destroying Timbuktu
Tombs, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016, 6:34 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/world/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-pleads-guilty-icc-destroying-timbuktun635716.
60. Id.; Timbuktu, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.
org/en/list/119 (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
61. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi Pleads Guilty at ICC to Destroying Timbuktu
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shrines were “the heart of Mali’s cultural heritage and were of
great importance to the people of Timbuktu;” their destruction
affected not only the direct victims of crimes, but also the people
throughout Mali and the international community.62
2. The Charge
The Government of Mali officially referred the situation to
the ICC on July 13, 2012.63 Al Mahdi was formally accused
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a)–(d) of the Rome Statute of
intentionally directing attacks against the ten religious
monuments and buildings.64 All but one of the structures was
part of the Timbuktu World Heritage site recognized by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO).65 The Office of the Prosecutor for the
ICC opened an investigation on January 6, 2013.66 On
September 8, 2015, the Court issued a formal warrant for his
arrest for war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against
historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion,
including nine mausoleums in Timbuktu, Mali, between June 30
and July 10, 2012.67 The Niger government surrendered Al
Mahdi, where he was taking shelter, to the ICC on September
26, 2015.68
Al Mahdi’s trial lasted for three days from August 22 to
August 24, 2016.69 In a surprise to the international community,
Al Mahdi pleaded guilty of the war crime consisting of destroying
cultural and religious monuments.70 Finally, on September 27,
2016, the ICC found Al Mahdi guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
Tombs, supra note 59.
62. Burke, supra note 55.
63. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information
Sheet (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/AlMahdiEng.pdf.
64. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence,
¶¶ 57, 61 (Sept. 27, 2016).
65. Simmons, supra note 49.
66. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information
Sheet (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/AlMahdiEng.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Mark Kersten, Some Thoughts on the Al Mahdi Trial and Guilty Plea,
JUST. CONFLICT (Aug. 24, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/24/somethoughts-on-the-al-mahdi-trial-and-guilty-plea/.
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of the war crimes, and he was sentenced to nine years
imprisonment.71
3. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution
The prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi represents a
number of firsts for global justice.72 The member of the terrorist
organization Ansar Dine will now be in prison for nine years, but
it is less clear how this case will resonate around the world, and
whether it can deter similar crimes.73 However, although subject
to some skepticism, Al Mahdi’s sentence still represents a
significant victory for international justice and shows that there
is hope that the ICC can expand its prosecutions and continue
its efforts to protect cultural property.
a. Criticisms of the ICC’s Verdict Against Al Mahdi
Not all international legal scholars and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) praised the ICC’s prosecution of Al Mahdi.
For example, Amnesty International’s Senior Legal Advisor
Erica Bussey commented that while the ICC’s prosecution was
groundbreaking, other war crimes in Mali, such as murder, rape,
and torture of civilians, remain unaddressed.74 The
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), an NGO
dedicated to the worldwide movement for human rights,
expressed their desire that other Malians should have been
charged with sexual and gender-based crimes, in addition to the
charges Al Mahdi received for destroying the cultural sites in
Timbuktu.75 Human Rights Watch called for the Malian
government to step up their efforts to ensure investigations and
fair trials for all human rights abusers during the 2012 conflict

71. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence,
¶¶ 43, 109 (Sept. 27, 2016).
72. See Kersten, supra note 36.
73. Id.
74. See Mali: ICC Trial over Destruction of Cultural Property in Timbuktu
Shows Need for Broader Accountability, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/mali-icc-trial-overdestruction-of-cultural-property-in-timbuktu-shows-need-for-broaderaccountability/.
75. See Mali: Al Mahdi Trial on Destruction of Cultural Heritage Opens at
the ICC, FIDH (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/malial-mahdi-trial-on-destruction-of-cultural-heritage-opens-at-the.
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in Mali.76 Some scholars expressed that the ICC actually had the
“wrong man” on trial77 and that Al Mahdi was just a “little fish”
in the grand scheme of the horrific violence in Mali.78
Other scholars have also been wary of the prosecution
because it is another “attack” on African nations by the
international court.79 Both Burundi and South Africa have
announced that they intend to withdraw from the Rome Statute,
which campaigners for international justice say could lead to a
“devastating exodus” from the ICC.80 Scholars argue that the
African Union (AU) has been a forum for anti-ICC sentiment,
and other African nations may now seek to withdraw from the
Court.81 This “African bias” in the court can be seen in the
numbers; the Office of the Prosecutor has sought to bring
charges against thirty-one individuals since the court began
operating in 2002, and all of them have been African.82 Although
ICC prosecutors have claimed to be considering alleged crimes
in South America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, no
concrete actions have occurred.83 Furthermore, by some
estimates, the ICC’s activities have cost at least $1.5 billion,84 a
significant expense considering the very narrow geographical
scope of its investigations and lack of success in bringing justice.
Despite these criticisms, however, the prosecution of Al
Mahdi was very significant for the ICC and boosted their
legitimacy as an international tribunal capable of bring justice.
76. See ICC: Clear Message on Attacking World’s Treasures, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Sept. 27, 2016, 8:39 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/
27/icc-clear-message-attacking-worlds-treasures.
77. See Fatouma Harber, Why the ICC Has the Wrong Man on Trial over
Invasion of Timbuktu, GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:00 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/30/icc-mali-timbuktu-invasiontrial.
78. See Mark Kersten, Big Fish or Little Fish—Who Should the
International Criminal Court Target, JUST. HUB (Aug. 31, 2016, 14:08),
https://justicehub.org/article/big-fish-or-little-fish-who-should-internationalcriminal-court-target.
79. See generally Sewell Chan & Marlise Simmons, South Africa to
Withdraw from International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-internationalcriminal-court.html (discussing the ICC’s allegedly disproportionate focus on
Africa).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Thierry Cruvellier, The ICC, Out of Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/opinion/the-icc-out-of-africa.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Because of Al Mahdi’s sentence, countries—especially African
countries—should look to give more political support to the ICC.
Many African nations, including Mali, do not have the political
or judicial infrastructure to prosecute serious war crimes.85 This
was one of the primary reasons why Mali actually referred Al
Mahdi’s case to the ICC.86 In the wake of the announced
withdrawals by South Africa, Burundi, and Gambia, a slew of
African governments have reaffirmed their backing for the
ICC.87 The ICC’s docket has also begun to evolve, which makes
the court more of an instrument of international justice, instead
of African targeting.88 If the ICC’s imperfections are to be cured,
then countries should be working together to garner more
support for the ICC, not the opposite.89 With more support from
African nations, the ICC would be better suited to bring justice
across the globe to those not only affected by the destruction of
cultural property, but also against victims of other heinous war
crimes.

85. Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Case Information
Sheet (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-mahdi/Documents/AlMahdiEng.pdf.
86. See id.
87. Elise Keppler, African Members Reaffirm Support at International
Criminal Court Meeting, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Nov. 17, 2016, 6:37 PM EST),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/17/african-members-reaffirm-supportinternational-criminal-court-meeting.
88. See generally Letter to Presidents of African States Parties to the ICC,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:21 PM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/11/15/letter-presidents-african-states-parties-icc (discussing the ICC’s
investigations outside of Africa and the ICC acting as the sole court to offer a
potential check against impunity around the world when national courts fail to
hold perpetrators accountable).
89. Id.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AL MAHDI’S PROSECUTION
Al Mahdi’s case was groundbreaking for several reasons.90
This was the first case arising from the 2012 conflict in Mali.91
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, this was the first time
that the destruction of religious and historical sites has been
made a priority charge as a war crime.92 Additionally, it was the
first time ever that an ICC war crimes defendant had pleaded
guilty.93 Finally, this was the ICC’s first prosecution of an
accused jihadist.94
Although international law has safeguarded cultural
property for centuries, international bodies and actors have
praised the ICC’s ruling for making much needed progress to
protect it.95 For example, Irina Bokova, the Director-General of
UNESCO, applauded the ICC’s efforts in the prosecution and
dubbed the organization as a “key element” in the broader,
global response to violent extremism.96

90. See generally Guilty Plea at ICC Timbuktu Artefacts Destruction Case:
Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi Pleads Guilty to Charges of Destroying Ancient
Cultural Artefacts in Timbuktu, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/man-trial-icc-destroying-timbuktuartefacts-160822100834765.html (discussing the numerous ways in which the
al-Mahdi case was “groundbreaking”).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Douglas Cantwell, Al-Mahdi Enters ICC’s First Guilty Plea, Admitting
to Destruction of Cultural Property in Mali, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Sept. 15, 2016,
5:01 PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/al-mahdi-enters-iccs-first-guilty-pleaadmitting-destruction-cultural-property-mali-august-22.
95. ICC Convicts Al-Mahdi of War Crime for Destroying Cultural Sites,
INT’L JUST. RES. CTR. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2016/10/05/iccconvicts-al-mahdi-of-war-crime-for-destroying-cultural-sites/.
96. Timbuktu Trial: “A Major Step Towards Peace and Reconciliation in
Mali,” UNESCO (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.unesco.org/new/en/mediaservices/single-view/news/timbuktu_trial_a_major_step_towards_peace_and_
reconciliati/#.V-xp0CgrKUl.
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1. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution Will Help Deter Other War
Criminals in the Future

In present-day Iraq and Syria, other members of terrorist
organizations, such as ISIS, have sought to annihilate or loot
irreplaceable cultural heritage on a massive scale.97 While there
are many reasons for this destruction, two common ones are
important to address. First, the looting of cultural heritage is a
method to fund continued engagement in a conflict or terrorist
activity. Second, the destruction of cultural heritage can further
the comprehensive denigration and destruction of the opposing
party in conflict—for now and future generations.98 Prosecuting
Al Mahdi for destroying these sacred monuments sent a stark
message to both the people of Timbuktu and to those looking to
continue carrying out the heinous war crimes: cultural property
is important, is valued by the international community, and will
be protected.99 Seeking accountability for war crimes of this
nature also sends a strong signal to Ansar Dine, the Islamic
State, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations that such
conduct will not be tolerated.100 The ICC can use the Al Mahdi
verdict as a precedent in prosecuting destruction of cultural
property, which has the potential to deter would-be war
criminals from carrying it out.101
While some commentators have found it unlikely that an
ISIS terrorist would pause the next time they are about to
destroy a holy temple or mosque,102 the Al Mahdi verdict still
has a deterrent effect towards future perpetrators. This is partly
because the ICC has custody over a known terrorist who is likely
to give investigators evidence of violent crimes committed
against human victims.103 This is especially important given
that the ICC has yet to indict anyone for murder or sexual
violence in Mali, and shows the importance of the verdict.104
97. Paul Williams & C. Danae Paterson, Tear It All Down: The Significance
of the Al-Mahdi Case and the War Crime of Destruction of Cultural Heritage,
WORLDPOST (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:23 AM EST), http://www.huffington
post.com/entry/tear-it-all-down-the-significance-of-the-almahdi_us_57e93786e4b09f67131e4b52.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Kersten, supra note 36.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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Scholars have also noted the impact of the “Lubanga Syndrome,”
in which anecdotal evidence shows how the impact of the
Lubanga case has generated a fear of arrest among Congolese
militia leaders.105 Reportedly, the Lubanga Syndrome has
induced Congolese militia leaders to release child soldiers from
their ranks and into Disarmament Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) programs.106 Other early studies on
prosecutorial deterrence show very promising results in terms of
halting hostilities in civil wars and violence against civilians, as
well as increasing domestic prosecutions of lower-level officials
in accordance with ICC prosecutions.107 Similar phenomena
could hopefully lead to analogous deterrence effects related to
the crime of destruction of cultural property.
2. Selectivity in Al Mahdi’s Prosecution is Inevitable and
Still Possesses a Deterrent Effect
The argument that Al Mahdi was too small of a player in the
Timbuktu travesty to make the ICC prosecution meaningful
does not hold merit. Since the complementarity principle
ensures that the ICC functions in a selective manner, the court
has to manage expectations and selectively pick and choose
which cases to investigate and prosecute.108 Fatou Bensouda, the
Prosecutor of the Court, has exercised her prosecutorial
discretion in themes, whereby nationally under-prosecuted
crimes are prioritized to help shatter domestic cultures of
impunity.109 Ms. Bensouda had, until the Al Mahdi case, chosen
the prosecutorial themes of gender-based crimes and crimes
against children.110 Although not as severe as violence targeted
105. See generally Mark Kersten, The International Criminal Court and
Deterrence—The “Lubanga Syndrome,” JUST. CONFLICT (Apr. 6, 2012),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2012/04/06/the-international-criminal-court-anddeterrence-the-lubanga-syndrome/ (discussing how guilty verdicts for
Congolese leaders that employed child soldiers has deterred them from
continuing the practice).
106. Id.
107. See Kevin Burke, The Deterrent Effect of the International Criminal
Court, CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS (Mar. 2, 2015), https://globalsolutions.
org/blog/2015/03/Deterrent-Effect-International-Criminal-Court#.WpByUud
ME2w.
108. See Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein, The Al-Mahdi Case and Thematic
Prosecution, JUST. HUB (Sept. 8, 2016, 13:40), https://justicehub.org/article/almahdi-case-and-thematic-prosecution.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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towards children or based on a person’s gender, Ms. Bensouda,
by selecting Al Mahdi’s case to be prosecuted, has added a vision
to the attacks on the cultural properties and has projected the
idea of “cultural genocide.”111
Other factors aside from prosecutorial discretion also played
a role in opening a case against Al Mahdi. Operational and
practical factors, such as being able to collect relevant and
necessary evidence, are key when the ICC determines where to
invest their scarce resources.112 The Al Mahdi case took these
factors into consideration when they chose to prosecute Al Mahdi
under the war crimes provision of the Rome Statute.113
Therefore, the absence of Ms. Bensouda tacking on sexual crimes
in Al Mahdi’s case should not lament this case as a failure or
exclusion; rather, observers should focus on the success that the
ICC had in getting a guilty verdict, which strengthened a new
criminal theme that can lead to future deterrence.114 Moreover,
the fact that the ICC prosecuted this case without expending
many resources gives hope that cultural property cases can be
more efficient and “easier” cases to prosecute.115
3. Al Mahdi’s Prosecution Can Help Protect Africa from
International Crimes; It Does Not Target Them
While the ICC has tended to focus its resources towards
African nations, the prosecution of Al Mahdi in particular can
actually have a positive effect on the continent. Mali referred Al
Mahdi’s case to the ICC to get assistance in the investigation.116
Because the ICC does not have a police or military force and
operates without an enforcement body, it is highly dependent on
state cooperation to execute arrest warrants, provide access to
evidence, enable the relocation of witnesses, and ensure the
enforcement of sentences.117 The case showed that two African
nations—Mali and Niger—cooperated together to work with the
ICC, and combated the perception that the continent is somehow
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Kersten, supra note 36.
116. Press Release, Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, Q&A: The Al Mahdi Case
at the ICC (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/q-a-theal-mahdi-case-at-the-icc.
117. Kersten, supra note 105.
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“against” the court.118 Because prosecutions for the gender-based
and sexual crimes in Mali have been out of the ICC’s grasp, the
court showed that it could help bring justice to war-torn African
nations that are incapable of carrying out investigations.119
A unique provision in the Rome Statute also allows victims
to participate in Al Mahdi’s trial. Article 68.3 guarantees victims
a right to participate in trial proceedings.120 Nine applications
were filed for participation in Al Mahdi’s trial.121 The Trial
Chamber found that each of the victims suffered “personal and
economic moral harm” as a result of Al Mahdi’s actions.122 The
African victims who participated in this trial demonstrate how
the destruction of cultural property damages more than
buildings and monuments; it also harms the social, cultural, and
historic fabric of communities.123 This participation in
proceedings shows the transparency of the ICC and its
willingness to bring justice to those harmed by war crimes,
which is something that African nations themselves cannot
always do.
B. A SOLUTION TO THE ICC’S LEGITIMACY PROBLEM: U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR PROSECUTING THE
DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
The objectives of the United Nations (“U.N.”) are laid out in
the U.N. Charter’s Preamble, whereby human rights and the
respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law are paramount.124 Today, the U.N. faces a
plethora of issues125 that have to be dealt with in a systematic
manner. However, with 193 member nations126 and the potential
of a veto on any proposed course of action from members of the
P5, the U.N. has struggled with maintaining international peace

118. Kersten, supra note 36.
119. See id.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 68(3).
121. Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See U.N. Charter pmbl.
125. See generally What We Do, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-we-do (discussing the various issues that
the U.N. faces in its efforts to bring peace to the world).
126. Functions and Powers of the General Assembly, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/background.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
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in recent years.127 Decisive action from the UNSC is needed to
start saving cultural property from being destroyed and
thwarting the rogue terrorists who are undertaking these
heinous acts. A concentrated global response to the destruction
of cultural property led by the P5 would help prevent this issue
and also bring more legitimacy and opportunity to the ICC to
expand their prosecutions towards other war crimes in the
future.
1. Increased Cooperation Between the P5 and ICC is
Paramount to Streamlining Investigations and
Ultimately Preventing War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity
The Rome Statute reserved a role for the UNSC in regards
to the ICC, “whereby the Council can refer situations in which
one or more crimes appears to have been committed in any State,
regardless of whether it has ratified the Statute of the Court,
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”128 The ICC, however, is
an independent “branch” that does not rely on UNSC referrals,
and can operate without UNSC consent.129 When the UNSC has
chosen to intervene and refer cases to the ICC, the results were
mixed. Twice in its history the UNSC has made use of its powers
to refer situations in non-Party States to the ICC: in Sudan
(Darfur) in 2005, and in Libya in 2011.130 Scholars have
applauded these referrals by the UNSC as part of a broader
effort to “maintain international peace and security.”131 Others,
however, have been critical of the P5’s role in bringing visible
success to these conflicts.132 In order to bring individual
127. See Somini Sengupta, The United Nations Explained: Its Purpose,
Power and Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/19/world/what-is-united-nations-un-explained.html?_r=0.
128. Tiina Intelmann, The International Criminal Court and the United
Nations Security Council: Perceptions and Politics, WORLDPOST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tiina-intelmann/icc-un-security-council_b_
3334006.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Honorable Navanethem Pillay, Encouraging UN Security
Council Support of ICC Cases Starts with Practical Steps, INT’L CRIM. JUST.
TODAY, Dec. 10, 2015, https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/
arguendo/encouraging-un-security-council-support-of-icc-cases-starts-withpractical-steps/.
132. See Press Release, Security Council, Amid Growing Brutality in Darfur,
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Urges Security Council to Rethink
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accountability to those responsible for destroying cultural
property, the P5 and the ICC need to take practical steps that
can encourage better coordination for current and future
investigations.
First, the ICC Assembly of States Parties needs to create a
formal mechanism whereby both UNSC members that are also
members of the ICC and the P5 meet regularly to discuss
relevant issues.133 With an improved relationship centered on
communication in regards to the destruction of cultural
property, local conditions where it is taking place, and the
domestic judicial environment, it is more likely that the UNSC
as a whole will be better suited to understand these pressing
issues. The United Kingdom and France should lead the way
within this new commission, since they are both P5 members
and parties to the Rome Statute.134 Their leadership would
ensure the mechanism’s stability and continuity.135 France has
already taken leadership in terms of attempting to curtail the
use of the P5 veto power in cases where a mass atrocity has been
ascertained.136
This kind of agenda, while ambitious, is necessary to mend
the contentious relationship between the P5 and the ICC, and to
eventually make it unimaginable for a P5 member to veto
resolutions that refer genocide, crimes against humanity, and
larger-scale war crimes to the ICC.137 A “Responsibility Not to
Veto” is perhaps the most suitable way to improve UNSC-ICC
relationship, given that customs and norms are pillars of the
international legal order.138 It is worth noting that the UNSC
has been critical of ISIS’s destruction of religious and cultural
artifacts in Mosul, Iraq.139 This kind of “peer pressure” from the
world’s most powerful countries is an important first step to
recognizing and dealing with this humanitarian crisis. While it
Tactics for Arresting War Crimes Suspects, U.N. Press Release SC/11696 (Dec.
12, 2014).
133. Pillay, supra note 131.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Why France Wishes to Regulate Use of the Veto in the United Nations
Security Council, FR. DIPLOMATIE, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/frenchforeign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/article/whyfrance-wishes-to-regulate-use.
137. Pillay, supra note 131.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on ISIL’s Destruction of Religious and Cultural Artefacts in Mosul,
U.N. Press Release SC/11804-IK/700 (Feb. 27, 2015).
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is extremely unlikely that a simple press release will deter ISIS
fighters from destroying cultural and religious artifacts, it is
nonetheless a vital first step to combating the problem. UNSC
leadership in this arena is critical to preventing these mass
atrocities in the future.
Second, an improved relationship between the P5 and ICC
will have a deterrent effect towards those committing crimes
against humanity and war crimes; other war crimes in addition
to the destruction of cultural property will decrease as a result
of this working relationship. Although less important than
shocking acts of murder, torture, beating, or rape,140 prosecuting
the destruction of cultural property is attractive for a few
reasons. For one, it will aid the ICC in improving their
investigative and prosecutorial techniques. As the ICC improves
its methods to gather evidence and witnesses, and works in
harmony with member-states to bring more prosecutions, it may
be able to shift its resources towards prosecuting the serious war
criminals that are suspected of murder, rape, and torture. This
is a goal that both the P5 and ICC should share.
Third, investigating the destruction of cultural property
does not have to be done in times of war. Gathering evidence and
putting together a successful case in a war-torn region under the
rule of a despot may prove extremely difficult for ICC
prosecutors, and is perhaps one of the primary reasons why they
choose to stay away from more serious war crimes.141 A
prosecutor’s ability to interview witnesses and collect evidence
in response to cultural terrorists destroying cultural property is
likely to be difficult to achieve when people in a village are being
raped or pillaged. Thus, the conditions are oftentimes ideal for
an international body to conduct a successful investigation.
Lastly, if the P5 and the ICC choose to team up and combat the
destruction of cultural property, they can preserve items and
artifacts which hold economic, political, and social value for their
nations and their peoples.142 As a normative manner, cultural
140. Sarah J. Thomas, Prosecuting the Crime of Destruction of Cultural
Property, GENOCIDE WATCH, http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/Cambodia_
Prosecuting_the_Crime_of_Destruction_of_Cultural_Property.pdf (last visited
Mar. 9, 2018).
141. See H.E. Judge, Second Vice-President of the International Criminal
Court, Keynote Address at Salzburg Law School on International Criminal Law:
The International Criminal Court – Current Challenges and Perspectives (Aug.
8, 2011).
142. See David W. Bowker et al., Confronting ISIS’s War on Cultural
Property, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (July 14, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/
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property is important because it encompasses a nation’s identity
and past; it is not readily replaceable; once looted, defaced, or
destroyed, it may be lost forever.143 Instead of being a symbol of
national heritage and pride, cultural property is being plundered
and sold off to finance terrorist operations.144 Because terroristladed countries such as Iraq and Syria are not members to the
Rome Statute, the ICC does not have personal or territorial
jurisdiction over them.145 Thus, the UNSC needs to be willing
and able to recommend prosecutions to the ICC in order to
preserve cultural heritage when it is under siege. Scholars have
proposed a number of other measures in the hopes of preventing,
deterring, and punishing ISIS for its devastation of cultural
property.146 However, prosecutorial efforts are the most effective
way to deter the destruction of cultural property now and into
the future.
2. A P5-ICC Coalition Can Help Guide Domestic Militaries
and Create International Legal Norms to Protect Cultural
Property during Times of Armed Conflict
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law . . . .”147
However, treaty law often leaves large gaps that need to be
filled.148 Those gaps are filled by customary international law,
whereby the international community has developed a set of
definable rules through custom that nations must accept as
law.149 Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) asserts that custom is “evidence of a general
practice accepted as law” that forms a fundamental part of

volume/20/issue/12/confronting-isis-war-cultural-property.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Id. (discussing robust international measures to prevent the
destruction of cultural property).
147. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969,
1115 U.N.T.S. 331.
148. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27
MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 n.2 (2005).
149. See Gerald Postema, Custom in International Law: A Normative
Practice Account, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 279, 279–82 (Amanda
Perreau-Saussine & James B. Murphy eds., 2007) (discussing traditional and
modern approaches to establishing customary law).
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international law.150 While the United States has signed the
Vienna Convention Treaty, the United States Senate has not
given its advice and consent, and therefore has not ratified it.151
However, the United States considers many of the provisions of
the Vienna Convention to constitute customary international
law on the law of treaties.152 Because the United States is
arguably the most powerful member of the P5 that has not
ratified the Rome Statute, customary international law
protecting cultural property should govern their armed forces in
times of armed conflict.153 A strong P5-ICC alliance could
therefore create effective mechanisms and customary
international legal norms to protect cultural property in times of
armed conflict.
Furthermore, it is imperative for armed forces to protect
cultural property in times of armed conflict. Avoidable
destruction of cultural property by military forces, especially
foreign military forces, endangers mission success.154 The
destruction of cultural property arouses the hostility of local
populations, offers the adversary a potent propaganda weapon,
undermines support on the home front among allies for the
continued pursuit of victory, and provides a source of income for
hostile non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations;155
similar to the one Al Mahdi led.
On the other hand, if a strong alliance is formed between
the P5 and the ICC that lays out rules protecting cultural
property in times of war, foreign militia can win the hearts and
minds of those affected by the destruction. While this Note has
addressed numerous sources of international law that have
attempted to govern the destruction of cultural property, there
is still a gap in the literature. The literature has failed to address
how a strong relationship between the P5 and the ICC can create
international legal norms for armed forces to follow in their
150. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
151. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
152. Id.
153. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Rule 38: Attacks Against Cultural
Property, INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2018).
154. See ROGER O’KEEFE ET AL., PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY:
MILITARY MANUAL ¶ 5 (United Nations Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. ed. 2016)
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002466/246633e.pdf.
155. Id. ¶ 5.
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efforts to prevent destruction—especially in the aftermath of Al
Mahdi’s trial. Both the P5 and ICC should look to build on the
momentum of Al Mahdi’s guilty verdict to streamline
communication between member state’s militias and the ICC in
regards to the conditions surrounding cultural property in times
of armed conflict.
The reason for the P5 and ICC to govern the protection of
cultural property in times of war is twofold. First, a unifying role
in articulating resources, procedures, and norms would be
advantageous to operations as sovereign militaries assess, plan,
and implement the international customary rules to protect
cultural property. This would increase cooperation among
states, and militaries could share technology and information
with each other in their joint efforts to protect cultural property.
For example, best practice dictates that particularly significant
cultural property should be placed on a no-strike list to be
utilized by military planners during target selection.156 This has
proved successful in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Mali, all of whom are
rich in cultural heritage sites.157 Because the “boots on the
ground” will be more informed on the country conditions where
they are stationed, they can also employ the help of civilian
experts in their efforts to protect the cultural heritage sites. As
mentioned earlier, this will help win the “hearts and minds” of
the civilian populations.158 The United States and other
international organizations already have developed a range of
training materials for military and associated personnel on the
protection of cultural property in both armed conflict and
stabilization missions.159
Consolidating these methods and sharing resources with the
rest of the P5 and ICC would only strengthen domestic
militaries’ efforts in protecting cultural property. Second,
because the P5 countries are often the ones who occupy other
nations in times of armed conflict, international law imposes
temporary duties on them to act as a “custodian” until the
sovereign’s governing authority is restored.160 Thus, if the goal
is for the occupying hosts to protect the country they are
occupying, it is best if they write the rules to protect cultural
property. These countries are the ones who are familiar with the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. ¶ 99.
Id.
See infra Section II(B)(2).
See Id. ¶¶ 62–63.
Id ¶ 163.
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conditions on the ground in some of these war-torn countries, so
working together with other P5 nations, while aiding the ICC in
their prosecutorial efforts, is the most effective and efficient way
to protect cultural property now and into the future.
III.

CONCLUSION

The prosecution of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi represents a
significant shift in the international community’s attitude
towards protecting cultural property. Never before has the
destruction of cultural property been prosecuted as a standalone
war crime. The fact that Al Mahdi was a member of a known
terrorist organization makes the prosecution all the sweeter for
those committed to protecting their cultural heritage from being
plundered by these rebels.
Although ISIS and other non-state actors are not parties to
the many declarations and treaties that protect cultural
property, they are still bound by IHL and customary
international law.161 The ICC Prosecutor, despite the many
hurdles, needs to attempt to build a relationship with the UNSC
and other nation states—especially African states—to form a
strong coalition to combat the destruction of cultural property.
However, this relationship needs to be coequal, and nation states
need to be more receptive of the Prosecutor’s role, and the
challenges that she faces when states continuously try to
undermine the ICC’s legitimacy. The hope is that Al Mahdi’s
prosecution spurs even more action from both domestic
governments and the ICC, and that region-by-region, countryby-country, cultural property can be protected for generations to
come.

161. Bowker et al., supra note 142.

